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In many federations closer integration is feared to bring about a process of regional di-
vergence. Therefore, regional policies are often designed to countervail the industries’
potential tendency for spatial concentration. The European Union, for example, ded-
icates about 35% of its budget to structural policies, which are intended to reallocate
industry from core to less prosperous peripheral regions (European Commission 2001).
At the same time regional competition through taxes or publicly provided goods, that
might act as a means to attract mobile capital is suspiciously treated. Following this
notion in 1998 an expert group on behalf of the ECOFIN Council listed more than 60
”harmful” tax measures. In a voluntary code of conduct the member states are supposed
to refrain from those policies1. In this paper we bring together those two issues policy
makers are concerned with. From a positive point of view, we analyze under which con-
ditions ﬁscal competition between regions aﬀects the process of agglomeration - will it
hinder or enforce it ? From a normative point of view, we determine whether ﬁscal com-
petition leads to an eﬃcient outcome in terms of the provision of public inputs as well
as the resulting regional allocation of industry. The latter issue addresses the question
whether a federal policy reallocating public input resources across regions is necessary in
order to achieve an optimal outcome.
Following Martin and Rogers (1995) and Dupont and Martin (2006) who deal with
regional policy in the New Economic Geography we model ﬁscal competition in a frame-
work where regional agglomeration processes are driven by increasing returns on the level
of the ﬁrms in combination with trade costs and monopolistic competition. We use a
footloose capital model (see e.g. Martin and Rogers, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2003) in which
regional divergence relies on some asymmetry from the outset. In our analysis two kinds
of asymmetries are considered. First, diﬀerences in regional infrastructural endowments
are taken into account. Due to increasing returns, trade costs and mark-ups on marginal
1Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1. December 1997 concerning taxation policy, 98/C
2/01.
2costs capital returns are higher in the region with larger stocks of infrastructure. It will
be shown that contingent on the level of trade costs diﬀerences in regional infrastructural
endowments may enforce, other things being equal, agglomeration. The region with the
better infrastructure attracts all the industry and becomes the core for suﬃciently low
trade costs. Second, as an extension diﬀerences in regional expenditure shares, i.e. diﬀer-
ences in regions’ sizes which are the basis of the home-market eﬀect, are also considered.
Having a larger home-market constitutes an comparative advantage in those models. We
are particularly concerned with the interaction of these two asymmetries.
A series of papers has dealt with tax competition in the New Economic Geography
as for example Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind et al., 2000; Andersson and Forslid,
2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and Pﬂüger, 2006 or Baldwin et. al., 2003.
Andersson and Forslid (2003) have already considered public consumption goods, but,
to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper which deals with ﬁscal competition via public
input in such a framework. The public input increases the productivity of the immobile
factor labor and is ﬁnanced by a residence based tax on income. In contrast to Martin
and Rogers (1995) we assume that public inputs reduce variable private costs instead of
ﬁxed private costs. There is clearly anecdotical evidence that public infrastructure aﬀects
not only set up costs, but also variable costs. E.g., improvement in public transportation
s y s t e m sr e d u c et r a n s p o r tt i m ea n dt h u sc o s t sp e ru n i t .
We derive the following main results: First of all we show that if trade costs are
high competition leads to a convergence in the provision of public infrastructure. This
reduces agglomeration tendencies which can be traced back to diﬀerences in infrastructural
e n d o w m e n t sb u ti td o e sn o ta ﬀect the agglomeration process due to size asymmetries.
Only if integration gets closer and trade costs are suﬃciently low one region may decide
not to provide any infrastructure and to free-ride on the other region’s infrastructure. The
reason is that it beneﬁts from importing goods at low trade costs instead of bearing the
costs of infrastructure provision itself. In this case, infrastructure competition accelerates
agglomeration.
3From a normative perspective the question arises whether ﬁscal competition leads
both to an optimal aggregate infrastructure provision and to an eﬃcient distribution of
infrastructure between the regions. In our model, infrastructure provision in one region
exerts a negative externality on the other regions because it attracts industry from other
regions. In some sense, this is similar to the external eﬀect arising in tax competition
models where capital is mobile but regions do not trade. The standard result in those
models with complementarity between the public input and private capital is overprovision
of the public input if the elasticity of capital with respect to the public input is larger
than the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Noiset, 1995; Sinn, 1997). Since in our analysis the public input is ﬁnanced by a tax on
a completely inelastic base (residents’ income) the same result would appear if this were
the only externality. However, the possibility of trade in combination with the public
good characteristics of infrastructure adds another externality of infrastructure provision
which is positive. For low trade costs it is cheaper for a region to import industrial goods
from other regions than to provide its own infrastructure in order to have industry located
nearby. This means the region free-rides on the concentration of public infrastructure in
the foreign region and saves the costs of providing infrastructure. In other words, the
region that provides all the infrastructure does not take into account the cost reduction of
imported manufactured goods in the foreign region. If trade costs are suﬃciently low this
positive externality dominates and an underprovision of infrastructure is the outcome
of ﬁscal competition. On the contrary, if the trade costs are sizable we show that the
amount of aggregate infrastructure provided in a decentralized equilibrium is too high
compared to a centralized provision of regional infrastructure. The reason is that imports
are expensive when trade costs are high and accordingly it is important to have industry
located in the respective regions such that the negative externality dominates.
Concerning the distribution of infrastructure across regions, low trade costs allow the
regions to import industrial goods at low consumer prices. In such an integrated market
a central government chooses to concentrate public infrastructure in one region which
attracts all industry to this core region and maximizes the aggregate productivity of the
4industrial sector while the expenses in trade costs remain moderate. For high trade costs,
in contrast, a central government would distribute infrastructure equally across regions
because the beneﬁt from saving trade costs is higher than the loss in overall productivity.
W es h o wt h a tf o rar a n g eo fh i g h e rt r a d ec o s t sadecentralized infrastructure allocation
would lead to a symmetric provision whereas a central government would place all in-
frastructure in one region and implement an agglomeration pattern. The reason is that
a single region beneﬁts from increasing aggregate productivity only to the extent of the
imported goods weighted at trade costs while the central government faces the full pro-
ductivity gain. Therefore, regions start to prefer the concentration of infrastructure and
the agglomeration of industry only at a lower rate of trade costs than the central govern-
ments does. Note that these results arise although we abstract from local spillover-eﬀects
between ﬁrms in our model. Such spillover eﬀects can also lead to lower degree of ag-
glomeration than desired from a welfare perspective and Martin and Ottaviano (1999)
have shown that in this case a trade-oﬀ between convergence and eﬃciency arises. Ag-
glomerated regions will attain higher growth rates in their model. Martin (1999) pursues
this argument to the question whether inter- or intra-regional infrastructure should be
provided. In our model, however, it is shown that such a trade-oﬀ may arise due to the
mere possibility of trade at low cost in combination with the public good characteristics
of infrastructure.
The next section introduces into the basic model and derives the impact of regional
infrastructure on the long-run allocation of industry. Section 3 describes the externality
of infrastructure provision which arises if ﬁscal competition between regions takes place
and determines the Nash equilibria for critical values of trade freeness. Section 4 con-
trasts the Nash equilibria with the allocation of a federal government taking account of
the externalities. Section 5 extends the model to asymmetry in population size and to
congestion costs and discusses the qualiﬁcations of the results. Section 6 summarizes the
main ﬁndings and relates to policy issues.
52 The Model
Following Martin and Rogers (1995) we use a model where the ﬁx e dc o s ti nt h em a n u -
facturing sector consists of a internationally mobile factor which Baldwin et al. (2003)
label the footloose capital model. A federation consists of two regions H and F which
are symmetric in terms of preferences, technology and trade costs. There are two sectors,
a manufacturing sector (M) characterized by increasing returns, monopolistic competi-
tion and iceberg trade costs, and a perfectly competitive sector labelled agriculture (A)
which produces under constant returns a homogenous good that is traded without costs.
This good is produced in both regions and is taken as the numeréraire, i.e. its price
pA is normalized to one. Individuals consume an agricultural good CA and a compos-
ite manufactured good CM as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The utility of consuming the
agricultural and the composite manufactured good is a logarithmic quasi-linear function
where μ is the expenditure share of the composite manufactured good.2 The composite
manufactured good again is given by a continuum of n diﬀerentiated varieties. In general
individuals prefer to consume as many diﬀerent varieties as possible. Their willingness to
substitute between the quantities mi of the varieties is given by the substitution elasticity
σ>1. Hence, utility is:3













Denoting personal net income by y, the budget constraint is
y = CA + PCM, (2)
2Since expenditure shares are exogenous in the model, income eﬀe c t sd on o ta r i s e .U s i n gaq u a s i - l i n e a r
utility function which captures only substitution eﬀects exhibits all relevant features of the model and
simpliﬁes calculations. See Pﬂüger (2004) for a detailed analysis of the standard model with quasi-linear
utility.
3μ − μln(μ) is added to simplify the expression for indirect utility; see below.
6where the economy’s consumer price index of the composite good P can be expressed in













Utility maximization leads to the aggregate demands for agricultural and manufactured
goods: CA = Y − μ and CM = μ/P, respectively, and the indirect utility V :
V = y − μln(P). (4)
Demand for each single manufactured variety mi can be calculated by minimizing the





On the supply side, there are three productive factors: interregionally immobile labor,
mobile capital and local infrastructure. The number of immobile workers in region j =
H,F is denoted by Lj, the number of capital owners by Kj, where each capital owner
owns one unit of capital. The total stock of capital is given by KW = KH + KF, while
world labor endowment is given by LW = LH + LF. Capital is invested internationally
but its return is repatriated. The agricultural good is produced with labor under a linear
technology. Perfect competition leads to marginal cost pricing. Furthermore the wage
is equal to the marginal product of labor, i.e. one. Manufacturing ﬁrms produce with a
non-homothetic technology and each ﬁrm produces one variety. A ﬁr ml o c a t e di nr e g i o n
j requires one unit of capital and, per unit of output, cj units of labor. Total costs of a
ﬁrm which produces variety i are Rj + cjMi,w h e r eRj is the reward to capital in region
j and Mi is the output of this ﬁrm.
In the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition mill pricing is optimal. Hence,
indicating producer prices by a hat, in the region where the variety is produced pi =ˆ pi
h o l d s ,a n di nt h ef o r e i g nr e g i o npi = τˆ pi is fulﬁlled, where τ are iceberg trade costs with
τ>1.P r o ﬁts of ﬁrm i in region j are
Π
j
i =(ˆ pi − cj)Mi − Rj. (6)
7Market clearing for a variety i produced in region j implies Mi = mi(ˆ pi)(Kj + Lj)+





Since all ﬁrms in a single region set the same price for each variety, local consumers
demand the same quantity of all local varieties and we may therefore refer to regions
instead of varieties. The regional price index of manufactured goods in region j follows





j nj +(ˆ pkτ)
1−σnk
¤ 1
1−σ ,k 6= j, j,k ∈ {H,F} (8)
Variable costs cj depend on local infrastructure in the respective region. The better the
local public good supply is, the lower variable costs are. In contrast to Martin and Rogers
(1995), we assume that investment in local infrastructure (Xj) reduces the variable factor’s
input coeﬃcient (cj) in the production of the manufacturing sector. Each region invests




The implicit assumption behind this deﬁnition is that the productivity of the variable
input factor increases with local infrastructure. Moreover it may increase at a diminish-
ing, constant or increasing rate depending on σ (diminishing rate if σ>2),s i n c et h e





where Qj is total output of this sector in region j. Hence the output elasticity of in-
frastructure is set to 1
σ−1,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes our analysis.4
To ﬁnance infrastructure income will be taxed in each region according to the residence
principle. Note that this implies that taxation has no direct impact on demand for
4Expressing the input coeﬃcient in terms of the elasticity of substitution σ is a common way to
simplify new economic geography models (Fujita et. al., 1999, p. 54; Baldwin et. al., 2003, p. 23).
8manufactured goods, since we have assumed that there are no income eﬀects in the markets
for manufactured goods. Eventhough the residence principle seem unrealistic with respect
to capital taxation we use it in order to focus on competition via the public input solely.
For now we model infrastructure as a pure public good, that is non-rivalry in its usage.
Later on we also consider congestion costs in the provision of infrastructure and show how
the results change if we have an impure public good.
Using the prices from (7), the deﬁnition of the price index (8), and the market clearing
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In the monopolistic competition framework, free and instantaneous entry of ﬁrms drives
pure proﬁts to zero and the reward to capital is equal to the operating proﬁt. Furthermore,
each ﬁrm requires one unit of entrepreneurial capital (i.e. n = KW), such that the number
of local varieties is equal to the stock of employed capital. The share of industry or capital
employed in region H can be deﬁned as sn = nH/n = nH/KW,w h e r en = nH +nF.N o t e
that Kj represents the amount of capital, which is owned by region j,w h e r e a snj represent
the amount of capital that is invested in region j. The share of population in region H





where N ≡ KW + LW indicates worldwide population.
Using the fact that pure proﬁts are zero, the short-run capital returns of both regions





























9with ∆H = XHsn + XFφ(1 − sn) and ∆F = XF(1 − sn)+XHφsn,
where φ = τ1−σ is the degree of trade freeness with 0 <φ≤ 1. These short run capital
returns illustrate the two opposing eﬀects ﬁrms consider, when choosing their location.
On the one hand they prefer the larger market (greater spop) a n do nt h eo t h e rh a n d
they prefer the less crowded one (less competitors for input factors, i.e. smaller sn).
Finally, note that average short run returns are independent of population distribution
and infrastructure endowment:
snRH +( 1− sn)RF =
μN
σn
≡ ¯ R. (14)
2.2 Long-Run Equilibrium
In the long-run equilibrium, capital owners cannot increase capital returns by relocation:
sn =0if RH − RF|sn=0 < 0 ⇔ χ<
φ
spop +( 1− spop)φ
2, (15)












where χ = XH/XF. Either capital is completely located in the region with the larger
returns or capital returns are equalized and both regions employ capital. If both regions
have the same quality of infrastructure, the larger region (i.e. greater spop) will attract
more and more industry during a process of falling trade costs. Sooner or later all the
industry will be concentrated in the larger region. This process is shown in ﬁgure 1,
where the share of industry in region H is depicted against the freeness of trade where it
10is assumed that region H is larger in terms of population.
Figure 1: Bifurcation Diagram
Having the larger share of industry implies also a lower consumer price index and
accordingly a higher real income. This can be seen by rewriting the price indices (8) of





















Considering only interior solution it follows from (16) that a higher share of industry
in one region decreases its price index and increases the price index in the other region.
However, the local share of industry increases with local infrastructure, therefore smaller
regions with a lower share of expenditure can compensate their home market disadvantage
by investing in infrastructure. For every combination of size asymmetry and trade freeness,
there is one ratio of regional infrastructure that ensures an equal distribution of industry.
Moreover, region H attracts all industry if it provides an infrastructure level X
Agg
H ,j u s t















2 (1 − spop)
φ
XH (17)
11Taking the logarithm of price indices (16), we can express the impact of regional
infrastructure in utility terms. Assuming interior solutions, that is 0 <s n < 1 we may






























These prices are only deﬁned for χ>φand 1/χ > φ. This means, the higher the trade
freeness the lower the potential infrastructure diﬀerences. Intuitively this restriction states
that consumer prices of imported varieties (i.e. the producer price plus trade costs) have
to be higher than the consumer price of locally produced varieties (i.e. the producer
price).5 Infrastructure diﬀerences that imply a lower consumer price for imports than for
local varieties would lead to full concentration of industry in the region with the better
infrastructure, no matter what expenditure shares apply.







ln[φXj]+A, k 6= j. (19)
In the following it will be analyzed how the distribution of industry in ﬁgure ?? changes
if regions are allowed to compete with infrastructure.
3 Decentralization
First, we analyze a situation where the two regions act independently, which we call
decentralization.
5χ>φimplies cFτ>c H ,t h u sˆ pFτ>ˆ pH. 1
χ >φimplies cHτ>c F, thus ˆ pHτ>ˆ pF.
123.1 Infrastructure and Price Index
It is crucial to the argument to illustrate the impact of infrastructure provision on the local
price index, because this is the channel through which the indirect utility of a consumer is
aﬀected. Two distinct eﬀects of infrastructure aﬀect regions’ welfare. First, a lower input
coeﬃcient obviously allows to produce more output for given input. Diﬀerentiating (16)
with respect to infrastructure and keeping the share of industry constant yields:
Direct local price index eﬀect
∂ ln(PH)
∂XH








XHsn + φXF(1 − sn)
sn < 0. (20)
Since the regional price index decreases, citizens utility increases. Second, from (13)
we know that capital returns increase in the quality of local infrastructure provided. A
region therefore attracts industry, when investing in infrastructure. The increasing share
of local ﬁrms again lowers the local consumer price index, because less goods have to be
imported in order to consume the optimal consumption bundle. This means citizens will
save on trade costs. Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to the share of industry and (15)
with respect to infrastructure yields:

























The ﬁrst part of this eﬀect |
∂ ln(PH)
∂sn | decreases with trade freeness φ, whereas the second
part | ∂sn
∂XH| increases. This means for high trade freeness, it is not as important for
consumers to have ﬁrms located in their home regions. However, ﬁrms get more footloose
when trade costs fall, which implies they are more easily attracted by infrastructure. This
results from the fact that the home-market eﬀect, which ties ﬁrms to the larger market,
looses some of its strength. Overall the indirect eﬀect increases with trade freeness.
For prohibitively high trade costs, that is φ =0 , there is no indirect eﬀect, because
ﬁrms will choose their location only with respect to the exogenous home-market size. In
13this case infrastructure does not have any impact on the long-run location of ﬁrms. For
inﬁnitely low trade costs, that is φ =1 , the restriction described above does not allow for
interior solutions. A corner solution with one region not providing any infrastructure has
to apply.
The amount of industry one region attracts, the other will loose. This is because the
number of ﬁrms in the economy as a whole is given by the stock of capital n = KW =
KH+KF . Therefore each region exerts a negative eﬀect on the utility of foreigners, when
investing in local infrastructure. Furthermore in uncoordinated behavior each region does
not consider this indirect negative eﬀect it has on the other region, when lowering the
regional consumer price index. A negative externality evolves, which gains relevance for
welfare because of monopolistic competition.
The public good characteristics of infrastructure generates an additional, counteracting
externality which becomes relevant if the trade freeness is suﬃciently high. For low
trade costs it might be cheaper to import manufactured goods than bearing the costs of
providing enough infrastructure to have a decent share of manufacturing ﬁrms located in
the respective region. Therefore one of the two regions may decide not to provide any
infrastructure at all and free-ride on the expenses of the other region. The same free-riding
externality occurs if regions are very asymmetric in terms of population and infrastructural
endowments. In this case it is very expensive for the smaller or less endowed region to
attract industry and it may decide to better import and use the foreign infrastructure.
Which of the two externalities dominates, the negative or the positive, depends crucially
on the trade freeness and the initial distribution of industry as will be shown in the
following.
3.2 Fiscal Competition Equilibria
Region will maximize welfare of their citizens in the long run by local infrastructure
investment ﬁnanced through income taxes subject to the residence principle. Thereby,
each region takes infrastructure endowment in the other region as given. Since wages are
14equal to one and capital returns in the long run equilibrium are the same for all capital
owners, the objective of region j can be written as
max
Xj
Wj ≡ Lj + Kj ¯ R − Xj − (Kj + Lj)μln(Pj) s.t. (15). (22)
In a Nash equilibrium, both regions solve simultaneously the respective optimization
problem.
In order to obtain general analytic results, we assume a symmetric distribution of
population in the remaining part of this section: spop =1 /2. Later on, we will numerically
solve for equilibria when population is asymmetrically distributed.
Depending on trade costs, ﬁscal competition may lead either to interior equilibria
and dispersion of industry or to corner equilibria and agglomeration, as the following
proposition states.
Proposition 1 (a) A symmetric locally stable Nash equilibrium
XH = XF =
μN
2(1 − φ)(σ − 1)




exists if and only if φ ≤ 0.1748.
(b) No Nash equilibrium exists if and only if 0.1748 <φ<0.2832.




,X F =0 ,s n =1 or XF =
μN
2(σ − 1)
,X H =0 ,s n =0 (24)
exist if and only if φ ≥ 0.2832.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, the provided level has the expected correlations.
It increases with μ, because manufactured goods gain more weight in the individuals’
preferences. The indirect eﬀect, and accordingly the competition for industrial ﬁrms,
gets the stronger the higher φ. Therefore, the provided level increases in trade freeness,
15too. The elasticity of substitution σ has a negative eﬀect on the equilibrium provision of











Figure 2: Interior Nash Equilibrium at Low Trade Freeness
In this case, free-riding will not occur, because the trade costs are too high to waive
local industry. In contrast, the regions prefer to invest in infrastructure in order to attract
industry from the foreign region.
Corner Nash equilibria particularly require that the periphery does not prefer to de-
viate. It may prefer to deviate from the corner solution of zero infrastructure provision if
any positive value of infrastructure provision exists that ensures a higher utility than the
corner solution does. There are two possible candidates that may be beneﬁcial for the
periphery. It either provides the optimal level for a interior solution or it provides a very
high level of infrastructure that attracts all industry from the core.
Corner solutions only exist if trade freeness is suﬃciently high. The intuition for this
ﬁnding is that both regions try to free-ride on the expenses of the other region if the trade
costs are suﬃciently low, since the costs of setting up local industry exceed the costs of








Figure 3: Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium at Medium Trade Freeness
In decentralized equilibrium we may distinguish three scenarios, with respect to the
trade freeness. First, if trade costs are very high, i.e., if φ<0.1748,o n l yas t a b l e
symmetric Nash equilibrium with disperion of industry exists. Second, for medium trade
costs no Nash equilibrium exists at all. Third, if trade freeness is high, i.e., if φ>0.2832,
only corner Nash equilibria with a core-periphery pattern occur. The ﬁrst case is depicted
in ﬁgure 2, the second in ﬁgure 3, the third in ﬁgure 4. These ﬁgures show the reaction
curves of both regions and — provided that they exist — their intersection points, the Nash
equilibria. Furthermore, full agglomeration lines where the entire industry is located
in either region are also shown. Unsurprisingly, regions do not increase infrastructure
investment further when the industry is already completely located on their territory.
T h ep e r i p h e r yw i t h o u ta n yi n d u s t r yd o e sn o ti n v e s ta ta l l .E v e ns t r o n g e r ,ar e g i o nw o u l d
not invest in infrastructure, if the other region provides a large quantity of public goods,
since the induced industry share were too low.
The shape of the reaction curves can be easily explained. Starting at low infrastructure
investment of region F,r e g i o nH invests as much as necessary to attract all manufacturing
17ﬁrms and to become the core. When the other region increases investment further, region
H must also increase investment in order to prevent capital ﬂight. If a certain investment
level of region F is achieved, this strategy becomes too costly. Region H now reduces
investment, leading to industry dispersion. A further increase in region F’s investment
ultimately exterminates any incentive to supply infrastructure. As a consequence, region
H does not supply infrastructure at all. For region F, the same reasoning applies. As can
be seen from the ﬁgures, the higher trade freeness is, the smaller the area is where both












Figure 4: Corner Nash Equilibria at High Trade Freeness
For low trade freeness (ﬁgure 2), reactions curves intersect once in the interior, for
medium trade freeness never (ﬁgure 3), for high trade freeness (ﬁgure 4) two times at
the axes. Furthermore, since in an interior equilibrium the reaction curve of region H
is steeper than the reaction curve of region F, this equilibrium is locally stable, i.e.,
adjustment along the reaction curves ultimately leads to the equilibrium.
184C e n t r a l i z a t i o n
A central government endowed with ﬁscal authorities may levy taxes on both regions sym-
metrically but distribute infrastructure asymmetrically. Furthermore, the central govern-
ment internalizes externalities regions impose on each other. Again workers and capital
owners in both regions are taxed in order to ﬁnance infrastructure. The objective of the
federal government is to maximize the sum of workers’ utility in both regions:
max
XH,XF
W ≡ LH + LF + n ¯ R − XH − XF (25)
−(KH + LH)μln(PH) − (KF + LF)μln(PF) s.t. (15).
To solve this problem, we assume again equally sized regions,i.e. spop =1 /2.
Proposition 2 Symmetric distribution of infrastructure is optimal for low trade freeness,
i.e., if φ<7 − 4
√
3 ≈ 0.0717. Otherwise, a corner solution with either all infrastructure
in region H or region F is optimal. Independent of trade costs, the optimum aggregate
infrastructure investment is




Proof. See Appendix B.
For high trade freeness, manufacturing goods produced in one region can be consumed
in both regions at low costs. Hence the federal government concentrates infrastructure in
one region in order to maximize the aggregate productivity in the manufacturing sector.
In this case the gain in aggregate productivity is higher than the rise of expenses on trade
costs.
For low trade freeness, the federal government distributes infrastructure equally with
the consequence of low aggregate productivity in order to minimize overall trade costs.
The savings on trade costs due to the equalized distribution of manufacturing plants
dominates the potential gain in aggregate productivity.
Comparing optimal infrastructure investment with the outcome from ﬁscal compe-
tition, diﬀerences occur with respect to the level and the distribution of infrastructure
19investment depending on trade costs. A comparison of the critical trade costs values
given in the pervious propositions yields immediately:
Proposition 3 (a) For medium trade freeness, i.e., for 0.1748 <φ<0.2832, the alloca-
tion of infrastructure cannot be determined consistently by decentral authorities.
(b) A decentralized federation oversupplies public infrastructure if trade costs are high,
i.e., if φ<0.1748 (where infrastructure investment is fully equalized). For high trade
freeness, i.e., for φ>0.2832, decentralization leads to undersupply.
(c) When trade costs fall, a decentralized federation changes too late from full equalization
of infrastructure investment and dispersed industry locations to a core-periphery pattern.
For medium trade freeness, both jurisdictions would alternately overbid and underbid
each other. As a result, a decentralized federation does not even come to a solution
to the allocation problem. For more extreme trade costs, decentral authorities provide
consistently infrastructural goods, but never eﬃciently.
The central government provides always XH +XF = μN/ (σ − 1) on aggregate. How-
ever, in the decentralized case each of the two regions provides μN/[2(σ − 1)(1 − φ)]
if the full equalization equilibrium applies. If a core-periphery pattern arises, the core
region provides infrastructure μN/ [2(σ − 1)]. The intuition for those results are as fol-
lows: For low trade freeness it is crucial to have industry located nearby, therefore the
negative externality from competing for industry dominates the positive externality due
to the public input characteristic of infrastructure and the regions overprovide infrastruc-
ture in decentralized equilibrium. As the trade costs fall below a critical value, importing
manufactured goods becomes cheap enough to waive local industry. This strategy allows
to save the costs of setting up infrastructure by indirectly using the foreign one. Using
infrastructure without contributing to the costs of providing it represents a free-riding
externality, which now leads to underprovision. Furthermore, if the industry is located in
o n er e g i o n ,t h ec o r ei sa b l et os k i mo ﬀ agglomeration rents, and thus reduces its eﬀort to
reduce production costs.
20Comparing dezentralization and centralization with respect to the distribution of in-
frastructure an ineﬃciency arises for the range of trade freeness between 0.0717 and 0.2832,
because corner solutions occur in the centralized economy already for lower trade freeness
than in the decentralized economy. Choosing a corner solution without local industry a
single region beneﬁts from increasing aggregate productivity only to the extent weighted
by the trade freeness. Therefore, the productivity gain it takes into account is smaller than
the aggregate productivity gain the federation faces as a whole. Moreover, the increase
i nt r a d ec o s t so ft h er e g i o nt h a tl o o s e sa l li n d u s t r yi sh i g h e rt h a nt h ea v e r a g ei n c r e a s ei n
trade costs, since the other saves trade costs. Both eﬀects imply that the federal govern-
ment chooses corner solutions already for a lower trade freeness than the single regions
do in Nash equilibrium.
5E x t e n s i o n s
Assuming symmetry and pure public goods greatly simpliﬁes the analysis, but our re-
sults are much more general. They will qualitatively hold in reasonably more complex
circumstances.
5.1 Asymmetric Regions
Asymmetry in population size does not change mechanisms and results fundamentally.
Although it is not possible to obtain analytical results, by way of numerical analysis it
can be shown that the comparison of decentral and central states leads to similar results
as in a state with equally sized regions. First, for low trade freeness, in a decentralized
federation both regions provide public infrastructure and the aggregate level of investment
is too high. For high trade freeness, decentralization leads again to undersupply. Second,
in the process of trade integration a decentralized federation changes too late from dis-
persion of infrastructure investment and industry locations to a core-periphery pattern.
21However, asymmetry is an additional source of ineﬃciency. For low trade freeness, com-
petition for mobile ﬁrms forces both the smaller and the larger region strongly to supply
public infrastructure. As a result, the diﬀerence in public investment in an interior Nash
equilibrium is too small. A central planer would increase investment in the larger region
and simultaneously reduce expenditure in the smaller region.
5.2 Congestion Costs
Of course, there could be congestion costs that act against the eﬃciency of agglomeration.
One possibility to take those into account is to assume that infrastructure entails usage
costs that increase in the local amount of ﬁrms (Sinn, 1997). This relationship can be

















where α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, represents the parameter of congestion. For α =0as well as for
symmetric industry distribution (sn =0 .5) there is no congestion, the price of infrastruc-
ture provision remains unity as before. The higher α and the larger the asymmetry of
industry distribution, the stronger the congestion. For full agglomeration the price of
infrastructure in the core region becomes 1+α. The implied utility for symmetric distri-
bution of infrastructure is the same as in the absence of congestion. Assuming again that
regions are of the same size, welfare for full agglomeration in region H changes to:
WAgg = LH + LF + n ¯ R − (1 + α)XH − (KH + LH)μln(PH) − (KF + LF)μln(PF) (27)
Comparing welfare without and with congestion, one can easily show that the critical
value of trade freeness where agglomeration becomes eﬃcient increases with α.
Considering the Nash Equilibrium congestion costs entail an additional externality.
While the marginal utilities of infrastructure in both regions are not aﬀected by the con-
gestion costs, the marginal costs of infrastructure provision are increasing in the stock of
regional infrastructure and the congestion parameter α. Hence, for low trade freeness the
22pressure to convergence in infrastructure levels is strengthened. However for suﬃciently
high trade freeness one may still expect corner solutions, i.e. full agglomeration, to arise.
When deciding on whether to provide infrastructure or not a region compares the cost
savings of not providing infrastructure to the utility loss of not having local industry and
accordingly having to import all industrial goods. Compared to the scenario without con-
gestion costs the costs savings have risen whereas the utility loss has not changed. Hence,
corner solutions may occur for lower trade freeness than necessary for corner solutions
without congestion costs. Regarding the eﬃciency of aggregate infrastructure provision
the resulting overprovision in case of low trade freeness may be alleviated, since a region
exerts not only a negative eﬀect on the other region when investing in infrastructure by
attracting industry but also a positive eﬀect by decreasing the costs of infrastructure and
accordingly the tax burden in the foreign region. The result of an underprovision in case
of low trade-freeness, however, is still valid, since congestion costs do not arise in the
periphery where all industry has left to the core. Obviously, the assumption of congestion
costs may only act as an additional externality as long as both regions have some local
industry that is as long as interior solutions arise.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Global markets become more and more integrated and trade costs are falling. We have
shown that this phenomenon alters signiﬁcantly the implications of ﬁscal competition.
When trade costs are suﬃciently low, it becomes favorable for regions to import indus-
trial goods instead of providing infrastructure. Thus some regions may prefer to quit the
competition for industry by providing better infrastructure. Those regions become vol-
untarily the periphery and specialize in the agricultural sectors. However, this free-riding
behavior of some regions results in a ineﬃciently low level of aggregate infrastructure
whereas the asymmetric distribution of infrastructure and industry is desirable from the
welfare perspective.
23Since externalities arise as long as trade is possible a centralized provision of infrastruc-
ture is welfare-improving. For low trade costs this means that the overall level of in-
frastructure should be subsidized. Thus, our model implies that regional policies should
subsidize infrastructure in core regions in order to achieve the eﬃcient level of aggregate
infrastructure.
Our model focuses on the eﬀects of ﬁscal competition on infrastructure provision and
industrial distribution. It neglects all eﬀects of information asymmetries between central
and decentral authorities which would make the case for decentralization. Moreover,
our model features only one industrial sector with industry-speciﬁc infrastructure. Our
results could be translated into a world with several industrial branches where eﬃcient
agglomeration means that various industrial sectors cluster in diﬀerent regions. This is a
tendency we observe in federations all over the world.
24Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We analyze ﬁrst candidates for interior Nash equilibria. From (22) we get for spop =1 /2
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.
Thus, the potential equilibria in the interior are
XH1 = XF1 =
μN












































Note that the second and third solutions are only deﬁned for φ ≤ 1/3. Calculating the
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2.
For XF = XH, the second-order condition ∂2Wj/∂X2
j ≤ 0 is only fulﬁlled for φ ≤
1/2. For the asymmetric candidates, the second-order conditions ∂2WH/∂X2
H ≤ 0 and
∂2WF/∂X2
F ≤ 0 require 4φ
2 +2 φ − 1 ≥ 0,i . e .φ ≥ 0.309017.
25The symmetric equilibrium is locally stable if the reaction curve XH(XF) is steeper
















which is satisﬁed for φ<1/3.
It can be easily shown that for both asymmetric solutions there exists one region
which would gain from abandoning public infrastructure investment completely. Thus,
the asymmetric solutions do not be Nash equilibria.
When one single region deviates from the symmetric solution and does not provide
public infrastructure, the gain for this region is
μN {1+( 1− φ)ln(φ) − (1 − φ)ln[(1+φ)/2]}
2(1 − φ)(σ − 1)
,
which is positive if and only if φ>0.1748. A single upwards deviation, i.e., a strong
increase in investment which makes the deviating region core, pays only if φ>0.4492.
Hence, already for φ>0.1748 a symmetric Nash equilibrium does not exist.
Now, we consider corner solutions. If one region, say region F, does not supply in-
frastructural goods, region H maximizes regional welfare WH by choosing XH = μN/[2(σ−
1)] (which fulﬁlls the second-order conditions for H). If region F deviates by supplying
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which is positive if and only if φ<0.25.I fr e g i o nF deviates upwards, i.e., if it supplies
X
Agg













which is positive for 0.2203 <φ<0.2832. Hence, for φ<0.2832 a corner Nash equilibrium
does not exist.
As a consequence, for 0.1748 <φ<0.2832 single deviations rule out any equilibrium.
26B Proof of Proposition 2
In order to solve the optimization problem (25) for spop =1 /2, we determine separately
interior solutions and corner solutions, compare the implied welfare levels, and, ﬁnally,
choose the strategy which leads to the highest welfare level.





























There are exactly three solutions for regional infrastructure investments. One solution
that implies full equalization of regional infrastructure, that is a ratio χ1 =1and absolute
levels:




The trace and the detminant for this symmetric solution are
traceχ1 = −
4(σ − 1)[1 + φ(φ − 4)]
μN(1 − φ)2 ,
detχ1 =
4(σ − 1)2[1 + φ(φ − 6)]
μ2N2(1 − φ)2 .
Hence, for φ<3 − 2
√
2 ≈ 0.1715 t h ed e t e r m i n a n ti sp o s i t i v e( a n dt h et r a c en e g a t i v e ) ,
and, therefore, this symmetric solution is a maximum.
Beside this symmetric solution, there are two asymmetric solutions that imply regional
infrastructure ratios χ2,3,w i t hχ3 <χ 1 <χ 2, which are only deﬁned for φ ≤ 3 − 2
√
2.
However, using continuity one can easily show that those two solutions are minima.
In order to obtain candidates for corner solutions, we set without loss of generality




and, thus, XH = μN/(σ − 1) (the second-order condition is obviously fulﬁlled).
27The diﬀerence in welfare between the corner solution and an interior symmetric allo-
cation of infrastructure is
μN
2(σ − 1)
[ln(16) + ln(φ) − 2ln(1+φ)],
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